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Abstract 
This paper discusses the implications of transnational media production and diasporic net-
works for the cultural politics of migrant minorities. How are fields of cultural politics 
transformed if Hirschmann’s famous options ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ are no longer constituting 
mutually exclusive responses to dissent within a nation-state, but modes of action that can 
combine and build upon each other in the context of migration and diasporic media activ-
ism? Two case studies are discussed in more detail, relating to Alevi amateur television 
production in Germany and to a Kurdish satellite television station that reaches out to a di-
aspora across Europe and the Middle East. 
 
Keywords: migrant media, transnationalism, Alevis, Kurds, Turkey, Germany Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
 
 
  3
Kira Kosnick 
 
Exit and Voice Revisited: 
the Challenge of Migrant Media 
 
 
 
 
In 1970, economist and political scientists Albert O. Hirschman published a small study 
that was to have a lasting influence on the social sciences. Exit and voice, he claimed, were 
the two alternative modes of action that those dissatisfied with the performance of different 
organizations, including that of nation-states, could pursue. Ever since, scholars across the 
social sciences have been concerned with trying to determine what prompts one or the other 
course of action, and the relationship between them. Like Hirschman himself, most take as 
a given that exercising the option of ‘exit’ will put an end to any attempts to exercise that of 
‘voice’. Yet, as this essay argues, the study of contemporary diasporic mass media might 
force  us  to  rethink  the  relationship  between  ‘exit’  and  ‘voice’.  Furthermore,  thinking 
through this relationship with regard to migrant media and diasporic activism opens up in-
teresting perspectives on the possibilities for cultural politics under contemporary condi-
tions of globalization. How are fields of cultural politics transformed by ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ 
no longer constituting mutually exclusive responses to dissent within a nation-state, but 
modes of action that can combine and build upon each other in the context of migration and 
diasporic media activism? 
In a follow-up article focusing more specifically on exit and voice in relation to the 
state, Hirschman describes exit as a prevalent feature of what anthropologists once called 
stateless societies: in case of conflict, members detach themselves from the collective and 
regroup, by joining a different collective or forming a new one (Hirschman 1978). As long 
as exit seems like a readily available solution to settling conflicts, the contribution of voice 
will be limited, he suggests. (ibid:95) Why should members of a social formation risk op-
position if they could easily leave it behind? In this regard, Hirschman describes the effects 
of emigration on nation-states in the 19
th and 20
th century as beneficial from the point of 
view of political managers and representatives of the state: with exit in the form of out-
migration as an outlet, those disaffected are less likely to resort to voice and demand politi-
cal change. This effect, Hirschman claims, carries over into the countries that receive im-
migrants:  ‘…new immigrants tend to be, at least initially, relatively unvociferous members 
of society’, thus reducing social protest in both sending and receiving countries (ibid:102).  
However, even a cursory look at political conflicts and social protests in 21
st century 
Western Europe and the Middle East suggests that migration offers no easy solution to the 
problems of representatives of the state, as Hirschman tended to believe. From England’s 
Brixton riots to violent immigrant youth protests in France, from Kurdish protests in Greece 
and Germany against the capture of nationalist leader Abdullah Öcalan to the more recent Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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Muslim cartoon-protests in Denmark and elsewhere: the message has been driven home to 
so-called receiving states that immigrants often do not leave prior affiliations behind, and 
engage in different kinds of transnational or diasporic politics. Transnational migrant activ-
ism is increasingly obfuscating the line between external and internal politics (Østergaard-
Nielsen 2003), a line that Hirschman and others not too long ago took as a given. Just as 
importantly, former sending states similarly have to confront the fact that emigrants are not 
just providers of economic remittances, but are developing new ways to voice their dissatis-
faction with the political state of affairs their in former home countries. Migrant media, 
ranging from locally produced radio shows to internet portals and satellite television, pro-
vide the starkest example of ‘voices’ that express their dissent even after the act of exit 
from a nation-state (Karim 1999). 
Migrant media are often described as a form of minority media that allow minority 
members to use media technologies for ‘internal’ communication purposes, in order to pro-
tect and promote ethnic and cultural identities (Cottle 2000, Riggins 1992, Husband 1994). 
However, there are few contemporary migrant media projects that do not also have ‘exter-
nal’ ambitions and effects, in the sense of critically ‘speaking to’ majority social and politi-
cal formations of which they form or have formed a part. Many of them voice their dissent 
explicitly with the aim of promoting political change. When it comes to the politics of rep-
resentation among minority groups, the struggle to ‘represent oneself’ thus cannot be di-
vorced from the hegemonic discourses and projects of dominant majority surroundings. 
Finding a ‘voice’ is therefore a complicated process – Hirschman hinted at this when he 
described voice as a ‘messy’ option of dissent, a graduated phenomenon ‘all the way from 
faint grumbling to violent protest’ (Hirschman 1970:16). Hirschman conceptualized voice 
and exit as two mutually exclusive alternatives – voice as the path pursued by those who do 
not leave and instead promote transformation within the state. But migrant media represent 
a voice that emerges after exit – often still directed towards the very country that migrants 
have left behind. Globalization not only presents new ‘exit pressures’ to states, it has also 
profoundly changed the conditions for voicing political dissent, for political activism.  
Nation-states such as Turkey, who once thought to rid themselves of political oppo-
sition via exiling those who most radically voiced dissent, now find themselves confronted 
with a strange phenomenon: it is under conditions of exile and diaspora that some dissatis-
fied groups are able to articulate opposition more forcefully than from ‘within’. ‘Exit’, for 
them, has not been the alternative to voicing political opposition, but in some respects the 
precondition for being able to raise their ‘voice’. 
This essay discusses two examples of migrant media production in Western Europe 
that attempt to voice the concerns of dissenting minorities, both of them in relation to their 
former home country Turkey. For both Kurdish nationalists and Alevi groups abroad, resid-
ing  outside  of  Turkey  has  opened  up  new  opportunities  for  critical  activism  and  self-
representation that would have been unthinkable from within, and that have repercussions 
for  the  Turkish  state,  its  nation-building  project  and  its  politics  vis-à-vis  minorities 
(Navaro-Yashin 2002, Kosnick 2007). 
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Migration from Turkey 
 
In the 1960s and early 70s, out-migration from Turkey constituted a mass phenomenon that 
could not easily be described as a political response to conflict within the country. The la-
bour-recruitment  treaties  that  Turkey  signed  with  different  Western  European  countries 
were designed as temporary measures, and almost all of those who went abroad for a stint 
in the booming economies of the recruiting countries expected to return. Yet the confluence 
of economic and socio-cultural hierarchies in Turkey meant that a disproportionate number 
of labour migrants came from culturally marginalized groups in the country, most notably 
Kurds and Alevis who were denied the rights to cultural self-expression and political orga-
nizing. While most of them would still not see their decision to work abroad as a political 
one, successive military coups in Turkey also produced smaller waves of political refugees, 
either actively exiled or seeking to escape repression. This proved to be of particular sig-
nificance to the development of Kurdish nationalism in the diaspora (Van Bruinessen 2000). 
As has been well documented, temporary sojourn turned into permanent emigration 
for many, after recruitment was suddenly stopped with the oil crisis and economic recession 
of the 1970s. In the decades that followed, former ‘host’ states such as Germany have had 
to come to terms with the fact that they had factually become countries of immigration, and 
migrants and their descendants have progressively come to see themselves as part of West-
ern European polities (Soysal 1994, 2000). Yet, increasing engagement with the country of 
residence has not necessarily weakened migrants’ interest and involvement in country of 
origin affairs, as earlier migration theories tended to predict (Malkki 1992). Quite the con-
trary, in many instances the greater scope for political organizing and expression that West-
ern European receiving countries offer has allowed migrants to address country of origin 
issues in novel ways. In the case of migrants from Turkey, this transnational activism is 
particularly visible among groups such as the Kurds and the Alevis, but has also been de-
scribed for Sunni Islamic groups (Ogan 2001, Ogelman 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 
Jonker 2002, Schiffauer 2000). 
Kurdish migrants, mostly from Turkey but also Iran, Iraq and Syria, form a consid-
erable presence among immigrant populations in Western Europe. It is estimated that up to 
one Million ethnic Kurds have migrated as labor migrants and political and/or economic 
refugees to Europe since the 1960s. Their numbers are difficult to establish, since their 
countries of residence register them in terms of citizenship rather than ethnic background. 
For many Kurds in Europe, however, national identity and ethnicity constitute key issues of 
political mobilization. This is also the case for Kurds living in the areas claimed as Kurdi-
stan, but the nation-states of which these areas form part have been actively suppressing 
separatist ambitions, with Turkey at the forefront of countering even feeble attempts to 
achieve cultural recognition as a minority group. As will be shown, the emergence of a 
Kurdish diaspora and late 20
th century developments in communication technologies have 
produced a new form and practice of Kurdish nationalism. The activities around the Kurd-
ish satellite station MED-TV reveal the potential of diaspora media activism to seriously 
challenge the territory-based cultural politics of the Turkish state. Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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Kurdish mobilization around issues of identity and sovereign statehood have inspired Alevi 
migrants as well. Estimates of the numbers of Alevis as a religious minority in Turkey vary 
widely, depending on the respective interests of sources, with the majority of claims plac-
ing their percentage around 10 to 20 percent of the population (Vorhoff 1995). Alevi or-
ganizations in Western Europe claim that their percentage among migrants from Turkey is 
even higher, given the confluence of regional and political factors in the migration process, 
with figures of at least 25%, or 500,000 people in Germany alone. Even though, many 
Alevi migrants were active in leftist political organizations since the 1970s, often as expa-
triate branches of political parties in Turkey, it was not until the late 1980s that organizing 
on the basis of Alevi identity took off (Sökefeld 2003:143). While not oriented towards a 
nationalist agenda, the demand for cultural recognition as a religious group both equal to 
and different from the majority of Sunni Muslims in Turkey was and is a central part of 
Alevi organizing in migration contexts. The analysis of Alevi migrant media reveals a dif-
ferent aspect of ‘voice’ in relation to the dominant cultural politics of nation-states. Despite 
having access to new media for public articulation in the migration context, Alevi migrant 
media reveal the difficulties of intervening in the hegemonic discourses of nation-states that 
position Alevis in different ways as a problematic minority group.  
 
 
Media Regulation in Turkey 
 
The Turkish state has a history of tight control over print media and broadcasting, having 
maintained a state-monopoly on broadcasting until the 1990s. Control has been most vigor-
ous and repressive with regard to ethnic and religious minority issues in both print and 
broadcasting sectors. Even after the introduction of private broadcasting, Turkey’s constitu-
tion, laws and broadcasting regulations all converge to guard and enforce the ‘indivisibility’ 
of the country. As article 5 of the constitution states, it is the primary aim and responsibility 
of the state to protect this indivisibility, and the unity of the Turkish nation. Attempts to as-
sert even basic cultural rights for the Kurdish minority in the country have been severely 
reprimanded and at times violently suppressed as alleged assaults on Turkish national unity. 
Efforts to establish Kurdish media in the country have shared this fate. Violence against 
journalists and media organizations in Turkey occurs with greatest frequency in relation to 
reporting on politically sensitive issues such as Kurdish separatism and state actions against 
it (UNHCR 2001). As Amnesty International has reported, several journalists have been 
tortured in police custody, or have 'disappeared' (most likely been murdered) in the 1990s. 
Between 1992 and 1996, 14 journalists who reported on the human rights abuses in Tur-
key's  Kurdish  regions  have  died  or  'disappeared.'  Most  of  them  worked  for  Kurdish-
oriented newspapers such as Özgür Gündem (free agenda), Özgür Ülke (free country), and 
Yeni Politika (new politics), which were subsequently banned for Kurdish-separatist sym-
pathies (Amnesty International 1996). 
Since 2001, constitutional amendments and legal reforms have taken place, particu-
larly with a view to Turkey’s EU membership negotiations. Yet, in its 2004 report on the 
human rights situation, Amnesty International states that freedom of expression and of as-Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
 
 
  7
sociation are still severely curtailed, particularly when it comes to targeting allegedly ‘sepa-
ratist’ or ‘divisive’ statements and activities. (Amnesty International 2004).
1 
The emergence of private, commercial broadcasting in Turkey began to reveal limi-
tations to state control over the mass-mediated articulation of opinions and positions. By 
way  of  satellite  broadcasting  from  abroad,  Turkey's  laws  and  regulations  were  circum-
vented, and in 1991 the satellite station 'Magic Box' reached out to viewers in Turkey via 
Germany. The state monopoly on broadcasting crumbled in its wake, setting off the so-
called televizyon patlaması, the television explosion of the 1990s.  
But new forms of control have been instituted that apply for broadcasts on Turkish 
territory. Since 1995, the newly created Higher Board for Radio and Television RTÜK 
(Radyo  ve  Televizyon  Üst  Kurulu)  imposes  temporary  or  permanent  broadcasting  bans 
whenever channels and stations are deemed to have reported ‘separatist propaganda'. Its 
members are nominated by the government, and up until 2004 had to include army repre-
sentatives. Thus despite the increased openness of the new mediated public sphere that has 
emerged as a result of private broadcasting, minority interests such as those of Kurds and 
Alevis are still difficult to voice in mass mediated circuits of communication within Turkey. 
 
 
Kurdish diasporic media  
 
Conditions for Kurdish media activism nevertheless changed dramatically with the arrival 
of the satellite television station MED-TV, a broadcasting project based outside of Turkish 
territory and thus much more difficult to control by state forces.  
Beginning to operate in 1995 with its studios in Belgium, different types of pro-
grammes produced in Sweden and Germany, a license provided by the British Independent 
Television Commission ITC and a transponder hired from France Telecom, MED-TV was 
from  the  start  conceived  as  a  transnational  diasporic  project  with  a  Kurdish  nationalist 
agenda.
2 Satellite broadcasting offered a way to simultaneously challenge different state 
prohibitions in the territories claimed as Kurdistan and to reach Kurdish diaspora popula-
tions in the Mediterranean region as well as all over Western Europe. The station was a 
tremendous success. One of the chief organizers behind MED-TV, Hikmet Tabak, has de-
scribed the reactions of Kurdish audiences when the station began to broadcast: 
 
“MeD-TV hit the airwaves spectacularly. … The word spread like wildfire 
and every Kurdish person was eager to get to a television screen. In the cities 
people rushed into cafes, in the villages everybody gathered at the houses of 
                                            
1 Such allegations are also raised frequently in relation to statements that refer to the 1915 massacre of over 
one million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as a genocide, a characterization that the Turkish state fer-
vently disputes. 
2 MED-TV's name was derived from the Meder people who are believed to have lived in Mesopotamia 4000 
years ago, and whom Kurdish nationalists regard as their ancestors (Eberle 2000). The name is thus a direct 
challenge to state-condoned historiographies in Turkey that trace their line of ancestry to Turkic populations 
in Central Asia (Hassanpour 1998). Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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those with a satellite dish. … The Kurdish people were amazed at MeD-TV, 
as if they had not known television before. Kurds were singing in Kurdish. It 
was a revolution. Thousands cried with joy.” (Tabak 2001:160) 
 
On the website of MED-TV, the Kurdish-nationalist newspaper Yeni Politika was quoted, 
stating that sales of satellite dishes in the eastern province of Elaziğ had increased by 40% 
during  the  first  six  weeks  since  the  channel  had  started  its  test  broadcasts 
(http://www.ib.be/med/med-tv/impact/satsales.htm,  visited  on  April  29,  1999,  published 
earlier as an article in Yeni Politika, May 14th, 1995).  
The Turkish state did everything in its power to prevent the station from being able 
to  function.  As  Tabak  has  described,  state  representatives  contacted  telecommunication 
companies who might provide a transponder even before the MED-TV staff had spoken to 
them, warning the companies that the terrorist PKK organization (Partiya Karkeren Kürd-
istan, Workers' Party of Kurdistan) was behind the channel. Such claims could indeed not 
easily be refuted. Though MED-TV always claimed political independence, it also gave 
room to PKK positions, often inviting PKK officials to explain their views (Eberle 2000).  
Turkish state representatives also lobbied the respective Ministries of Foreign Af-
fairs in the countries involved, which in turn applied pressure on different telecommunica-
tion ventures. When MED-TV eventually did manage to lease a transponder from French 
Telecom and obtain a license from ITC, the Turkish press initiated a protest campaign, de-
nouncing the channel as a terrorist project. But it was Turkish protest at the highest political 
level which proved to be most effective. 
 Tansu Çiller, Turkish prime minister at the time, went to visit her counterpart John 
Major in London to have the ITC license revoked. After the transponder lease was up, 
France Telecom did not renew the contract, and MED-TV was forced to lease from Portu-
guese  Telecom,  obtaining  only  a  three-months  contract.  Turkey's  president  Süleyman 
Demirel went to Lisbon and publicly asked that the contract be withdrawn. The contract 
was not renewed, forcing MED-TV to start another search, ending with a contract with the 
Polish Telecommunications Agency PTS. Pressure from Turkey this time led to a straight-
forward cancellation of the contract. In the summer of 1996, MED-TV was off the air for 
45 days, before another contract could be signed with an American-based company. How-
ever, Belgian police raided the studios of the station and arrested staff members and guests, 
confiscating archives and computers. The station's bank accounts were temporarily frozen. 
The Turkish Interior Minister publicly claimed joint responsibility. Another problem arose 
when Turkish police and gendarmerie forces began to raid houses in Turkey which had 
their satellite dishes turned in the direction of the Intelsat signal that transmitted MED-TV.  
 
“The police were trained to identify who was watching MeD-TV. Turkish 
television viewers were pointing their antennas to Eutelsat at 10 Degrees 
East, or Turkish Sat at 45 Degrees East, and because Intelsat was at 18 De-
grees West, our viewers were easily identified. They were arrested and their 
antennas shot at. Kurds begged us to change the satellite because of the risk 
using this transponder meant for our viewers.” (Tabak 2001:168) Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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MED-TV switched again, this time hiding behind another company which signed a contract 
with Slovak Telecom, allowing the station to have its programming transmitted again via 
the Eutelsat satellite. In July 1997, Turkey was able to jam MED-TV's satellite signal for 23 
days. In September 1998, a Slovakian political delegation announced the cancellation of the 
contract during a visit to Turkey, forcing the station to switch once more to an American 
satellite connection. But the final blow was dealt to MED-TV when the British ITC re-
voked its license in April 1999. The ITC had repeatedly diagnosed violations of its regula-
tions such as calls to violence and 'hateful speech' during MED-TV's programmes.  
As stated, MED-TV was made possible by a combination of different kinds of local 
knowledge and financial capital, national broadcasting regulations in different states, and 
transnational media infrastructures. Given its transnationality, it is not surprising to find 
that after MED-TV’s demise, a new station was quickly founded and began to broadcast, 
this time as Medya TV, based in Paris. In February 2004, the French authorities closed it 
down. Yet only one month later, a new satellite station, Roj TV, started broadcasting from 
Denmark. While the Turkish state continues with diplomatic pressure to have the station 
shut down
3, significant changes have begun to take place within Turkey. 
Turkish state forces eventually came to realize that they could not stop the produc-
tion of Kurdish-nationalist television abroad, and neither could they effectively prohibit and 
control the reception of such programmes via satellite dishes in Turkey. As a result, the 
Turkish state has begun to change its stance on the public use of Kurdish languages, for-
merly strictly prohibited in all public contexts including schools and the media. In the con-
text of the debate on how to gain membership in the EU – who had encouraged Turkey to 
grant cultural rights to Kurds – the government began to discuss radical policy changes. On 
November 15, 2000, the Turkish Daily News quoted deputy prime minister Mesut Yılmaz 
of the center-right Motherland Party (ANAP) as saying that the unity and integrity of Tur-
key had to be preserved, but that  
 
“The real threat to the unity of the nation is the broadcasting and brainwash-
ing of Millions of our citizens by separatist organizations. Unfortunately, we 
cannot prevent this through fines and bans because of advances in technol-
ogy. The state should use its mind and see that we have no other way of pre-
serving our values.” (Mesut Yılmaz quoted in the Turkish Daily News, 15 
November 2000) 
   
 
The challenge of new communication technologies 
 
The arguments now emerging from Turkish government circles and state officials were in 
stark contrast to the policies enforced since the beginnings of the Republic that were to en-
                                            
3 Turkey’s current prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan went on a state visit to Denmark in November 2005 
and demanded that the station  should be closed down by Danish authorities.  Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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sure cultural and linguistic homogeneity. To regard Kurdish spoken by a sizeable part of 
Turkey's population as simply a neutral fact rather than a problem to be eradicated was a 
first step towards the recognition of ethno-cultural differences in Turkey. Without Kurdish 
satellite television, making use of the freedoms and loopholes of Western European media 
regulations, this process might not have begun. Similarly, Iran has begun to produce pro-
grammes in the Hawrami language of local Kurds, after the government became aware of 
the influence of satellite television.
4  
Apart from the impact on state politics that Kurdish satellite television has had in 
Turkey and Iran, it has also fulfilled important functions in promoting the standardization 
of Kurdish dialects, moving Sorani and Kurmanji closer together and expanding their vo-
cabularies (Fatah 2003). Though a transnational medium, it thereby engages in a classical 
task of nation-building, drawing Kurds into a national linguistic community, albeit a dias-
poric one (Curtis 2005). Satellite television has also given a public, transnational platform 
for Kurdish leaders and intellectuals, who now visibly claim to speak for and to Kurds 
world-wide.  
Political mobilization has become more public and instantaneous, though it is only 
complementing the more clandestine communication routes which link Kurdish activists 
and sympathizers across different localities. MED-TV, Medya and Roj could/would not 
openly call for violent protest or other forms of illegal action, but, as one PKK sympathizer 
and local media activist in Berlin stated in an interview: ”One phone call, and we have ten 
thousand people on the streets within a matter of hours.“ The instant protests all across 
Europe that followed the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan gave evidence of the 
dense communication structure among diaspora Kurds. The need to evade state persecution 
– even outside Turkey’s territory – has contributed to this structure not merely being top-
down.  
Östen Wahlbeck has described the operation of transnational social networks among 
diasporic Kurds in Britain and Finland, pointing to the frequency of transnational contacts 
across Europe and the importance of communication technologies for members of a dias-
pora who retain and sometimes newly forge strong identifications with a deterritorialized 
‘Kurdish nation’ (Wahlbeck 1998).  
The successful operation of MED-TV relied on such identifications and networks, 
and on the transnational cooperation they were able to facilitate. While Roj TV objects to 
be seen as the continuation of MED-TV or any other Kurdish satellite television station
5, 
audiences and analysts certainly see Roj as a successor project. The speed with which new 
Kurdish migrant broadcasting ventures could emerge in different European locations sug-
gests close networking among groups and individuals located across the continent, enabling 
                                            
4 Relative Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq has allowed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to start 
Kurdistan TV in 1998, also available online at http://www.kurdistan.tv/. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) features the satellite station Kurdsat, available online at http://kurdsat.netro.ca/kurdsat. 
5 In  an  e-mail  sent  to  and  published  on  Kurdish.media.com,  18/02/2006,  ‘Clarification  from  Roj  TV’, 
http://www.kurdmedia.com/news.asp?id=11413, accessed 21/03/2006. Such distancing seems wise in terms 
of possible attempts to shut down the station on the basis of alleged infringements and violations committed 
by MED-TV or Medya TV. Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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the re-channeling of financial contributions, of broadcasting expertise and locally produced 
programmes from one European city to another. In the course of research on locally pro-
duced migrant television in the city of Berlin, the producer of a Kurdish programme on 
Berlin’s open-access station explained to the author that activists from at least four different 
European countries had pooled their resources in Belgium to make MED-TV possible, and 
that programme contributions were similarly coming from different directions.  
The example of Kurdish broadcasting in Berlin, local yet at the same time linking 
up with other Kurdish media activists across Europe, shows how local practices can tie into 
and promote transnational media activism.
6 Kurdish satellite television owes its existence to 
an intermeshing of different scales of political practice – local, national, and transnational – 
that could not happen without the emergence of new media technologies and linked com-
municative networks. This intermeshing of scales is what renders Kurdish diasporic nation-
alism so effective – it is impossible for the opposing states to effectively target all localities 
of activism, and impossible also to target all communication links between them. New mass 
media technologies in the context of diaspora networks have thus enhanced public visibil-
ity, flexibility and range of movement for non-state and anti-state actors, making it much 
more  difficult  for  state  governments  to  squash  public  ‘voices’  of  protest.  The  cat-and-
mouse game between MED-TV and the Turkish state is a case in point. 
 
 
Alevi migrant media 
 
The case of Kurdish satellite television might suggest that mass mediated migrant ‘voices’ 
are mainly a matter of escaping direct repression and obtaining access to appropriate com-
munication technologies. Yet, even on MED-TV, the question of what Kurdish dialect the 
representatives of Kurdish nationhood should speak was hotly debated. The station broad-
cast in different languages and even included Turkish, due to the fact that a part of its tar-
geted audience could not speak any of the Kurdish dialects.  
But the problems of how to articulate one’s voice, once given the opportunity to do 
so, are not merely of a linguistic nature. Looking at the example of Alevi migrant broad-
casting in Germany, the importance of questioning the representational character of ‘voice’ 
comes into view. Albert Hirschman acknowledged that the ‘voice’ option of dealing with 
dissent presented far more problems than that of ‘exit’: 
                                            
6 Apart from broadcasting, print and non-public forms of communication, the internet plays a growing role, 
ranging from public portals to chat rooms and newsgroups with restricted access and membership. It is diffi-
cult to gain an overview over the wide range of internet sites and forums dedicated to Kurdish issues. What 
can be said, however, is that its contents elude the control of state forces even more so than satellite television 
does. Larger portals seem to have contributors from across Europe, and web content is often presented in 
various languages, Western European, Turkish and Kurdish dialects. It is evident that the internet allows or-
ganized Kurdish groups to „jump scales’, to form new political alliances translocally and to reach out to new 
publics (Smith 2001). Television remains crucial, though, since low rates of literacy, high costs of computer 
technology and lack of internet access constitute a major impediment to participation among Kurdish popula-
tions, as they do elsewhere in the Middle East (Sakr 2002). Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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“It is a far more ‘messy’ concept because it can be graduated, all the way 
from faint grumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of one’s criti-
cal opinions rather than a private, ‘secret’ vote… Voice is political action par 
excellence.” (Hirschman 1970:16) 
 
As was seen above, in the context of a deterritorialization of political conflict ‘exit’ can also 
form part of a strategy of political action. But more importantly for the concept of ‘voice’, 
it is not just the intensity of protest or the political nature of ‘voice’ that renders the concept 
‘messy’, in Hirschman’s terms. While much of the literature on immigrant minorities and 
media assumes that access to and representation in the mass media is what guarantees a di-
versity of viewpoints and voices in the mediated public sphere, the precise nature of such 
representation is rarely explored.
7  
As I have discussed elsewhere (Kosnick 2004, 2007), the assumption that any pub-
lic statement made by a member of an immigrant group will form an ‘authentic’ representa-
tion of the ‘voice’ of that group is highly problematic. It glosses over the distinction be-
tween representation as ‘speaking for’ as an act that implies a political sense of delegation, 
and representation as an act of ‘depicting something’ (Spivak 1988). Beyond the represen-
tative character of all communicative acts that cannot but operate with signs to signify and 
construct meaning, the concept often also entails a sense of representation as ‘speaking for 
someone,’ a sense that implies a political mandate.  
Collapsing these two dimensions of representation in the context of immigrant mi-
nority media means to ignore the potential heterogeneity and power differentials within 
immigrant/ethnic groups that are treated as collectives. But what is more, a focus merely on 
access  and  visibility  also  ignores  the  difficulties  for  subaltern  minorities  to  articulate 
‘voices’  that  can  register  in  differently  situated  public  discourses  as  ‘critical  opinions’. 
Such critical articulations depend not just on the possibilities for raising a voice, but on the 
mass-mediated discursive contexts within which they appear as one voice among others. In 
order to make themselves heard, subaltern migrant groups often have to resort to very stra-
tegic politics of signification, so that their positions will be taken seriously in the dominant 
discursive contexts at which they are aimed.  
Alevi  migrant  media  are  a  case  in  point.  As  for  Kurdish  migrants,  the  Western 
European migration context has provided Alevis with new possibilities for organizing and 
opportunities for ‘going public’ vis-à-vis a range of different audiences (Sökefeld 2003). 
Marginalized as a religious minority in Turkey which allegedly practices an ‘improper’ 
form of Islam, the differences that separate Alevis from Sunni Islam are very differently 
valued  in  dominant  Western  European  perspectives  on  Muslims  (Mandel  1989,  1990). 
Elements such as the absence of veiling and explicit religious dress codes, the rejection of 
                                            
7 Scholars and political analysts have interpreted representation mainly in the sense of access and visibility, as 
evidenced in European initiatives like ‘More Colour in the Media’, a network supported by the European 
Commission Community Action Program to Combat Discrimination, and in academic publications such as 
Cottle 2000, Frachon and Vargaftig 1995, Husband 1994, Riggins 1992.  Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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Sharia law and emphasis on tolerance and diversity allow Alevis to represent themselves as 
more ‘benign’ Muslims in a climate that is increasingly marked by fears of Islamic extrem-
ism (Bunzl 2005). Yet, as will be shown, Alevi media activists are similarly concerned with 
their perception in the eyes of Sunni Muslims, both in the diaspora context and in Turkey.  
While Alevi migrants have no satellite television presence, many organizations and 
smaller local groups are active on the internet and in contexts such as open-access televi-
sion, particularly in Germany. Open-access television stations exist in all of the urban cen-
tres that have substantial immigrant populations from Turkey, such as Berlin, Hamburg or 
Frankfurt.  
In  Berlin,  a  range  of  different  Alevi  groups  has  been  producing  amateur  pro-
grammes at the local Open Channel (Offener Kanal Berlin, OKB), aimed at both German 
and Turkish immigrant audiences (Kosnick 2004). The OKB charges no fees for the use of 
its equipment and studio facilities, and provides technical support to its so-called ‘users’, in 
order to keep access barriers as low as possible. Furthermore, the channel refrains from in-
terfering with programme contents: anything that remains within the limits of the German 
constitution, does not contain commercial advertising and is produced by users themselves 
can be broadcast.
8 This is in keeping with the basic Open Channel mission to increase plu-
ralism and diversity in  mass-mediated public spheres,  a mission shared by  open-access 
channels all over the country. Open Channel migrant broadcasting therefore provides an 
interesting case study for analyzing the ‘voicing’ of critical opinions under almost ideal 
conditions of non-interference and access to mass media production and distribution facili-
ties.  
Despite low access thresholds and non-interference, even a context like open-access 
television cannot ensure that Alevi migrants will ‘speak in their own voice’. Alevi migrant 
media producers do not simply ‘raise their voice’,  as if  what Alevis had to say  was  a 
straightforward function of their belonging to an Alevi community that ‘speaks for itself’. 
The analysis of Alevi programming and conversations with their producers instead reveal a 
multiplicity of ‘voices’, some of which even appear to be contradictory. This multiplicity 
can be understood only if both the particular situation of Alevi migrants as a subaltern mi-
nority and the different dominant discourses in which they seek to intervene are kept in 
mind.  
Two examples of Alevi ‘voices’ are briefly introduced here: too briefly to do more 
than give an indication of the problems that ‘speaking for oneself’ can entail for subaltern 
migrant groups (I have analyzed Alevi media programmes in more depth in Kosnick 2004). 
The first ‘voice’, which can be found in similar form across a range of different Alevi pro-
grammes, is aimed towards an audience of Sunni Muslims, who constitute the majority 
population in Turkey as well as in the Western European migration context. The intention 
                                            
8 I have discussed elsewhere the different kinds of restrictions that the channel has imposed to curb the in-
creasing volume of religious programming, and its reaction to the September 11th events in the United States, 
which both combined to discourage many immigrant producers from using the Open Channel facilities (Kos-
nick, 2007). Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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of representing Alevilik to this audience is to dispell common stereotypes of Alevis and to 
establish the equality of Alevi belief with Sunni orientations under the roof of Islam.  
In a Turkish-language Alevi programme broadcast on the OKB in 1998, the ques-
tion of Sunni perceptions of Alevilik was at issue:  
 
“Now we want to present to you some misconceptions that are widespread 
among the people (halk), and will try to learn about them from the most 
knowledgeable sources, if you permit, esteemed viewers. As you all remem-
ber, we have had a radio station for some time, Köln Radyosu. … In a recent 
broadcast there, there was a Sunni sister (bacı) who called, and this is what I 
heard from her: '… I slaughtered the animal to be sacrificed (kurban kestim) 
and gave some meat to the Germans, some to the kızılbaşlar
9, that is to the 
Alevis. Now I wonder, did I do injustice to the sacrifice?' How sad that we 
hear such dangerous fatwas, using modern technologies. Of course it is not 
the sister who should be blamed, she has been taught like that. But so we 
will  hear  today  from  our  dede  [male  spiritual  leaders  among  the  Alevis, 
K.K.] how it is that the Alevis and Bektaşi actually sacrifice their animals, 
listen closely.” 
 
Like many other Alevi programmes, the broadcast is aiming to respond to Sunni stereo-
types of Alevis, implicitly addressing as its audience a Turkish-speaking population that is 
hostile, or at least unfamiliar with Alevi beliefs and practices. The producer of the pro-
gramme Kırk Budak explained it as an effort to find common ground with Sunni Muslims: 
 
“I think the importance of our programme for the Turks here is this: we try 
to make ourselves known to those people that come from Islam, those who 
call themselves Muslim. We tell them, yes, there are differences between us, 
but there is only one Islam and only one right way! Let's find this way to-
gether, this is why we explain ourselves to them. Let's stop the enmity be-
tween us.” 
 
Another broadcaster who represents a different Alevi organization at the Open Channel 
concurred with this aim when it comes to Turkish Muslim audiences: 
 
“We want to make people see those beautiful, nice dimensions of Alevilik 
that they don't know about. And definitely, even among those who know of 
us, we think there are some prejudices. To remove the prejudices, I don't 
know, the slander that has been leveled against Alevis, well, things like mum 
                                            
9 The term kızılbaş, 'redhead,' has become a widespread pejorative term for Alevis in Turkey. It emerged in 
the early 16
th century Ottoman Empire as a label for heterodox Muslims. Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
 
 
  15
söndü
10, not distinguishing between mother and sister and such, to stop this 
ugly slander that people have picked up, there is a need for these broadcasts. 
We want them to learn about Alevilik not from others, not from the media of 
the state, not from the Alevis that are on the side of the state, but from the 
real Alevi people, from those who struggle for the original Alevilik!” 
 
Yet, when it comes to addressing German non-immigrant audiences, very different aspects 
of Alevilik are highlighted – particularly those that distinguish Alevis from Sunni Muslims. 
The same producer justified a different agenda for German-language broadcasts: 
 
“Now if I say to a German or a European, there are twenty Million Alevis in 
Turkey. … they will wonder, who are those people. But if they are told what 
Alevilik is about, see, it is this, it is liberal in its religious beliefs, it wants to 
build schools instead of mosques in the village. It is laicist, it respects human 
rights. … There is no division between men and women … See, the Alevi 
woman does not wear a headscarf. She dresses any way she wants to. She is 
free. When I say that, they ask, does all of that exist in Turkey, in an Islamic 
state? They don't know that …” (Büyükgöl, interview June 1998) 
 
In their German-language programmes more generally, Alevi organizations stress the crite-
ria that make them different from Sunni Muslims: women not wearing headscarfs, not pray-
ing in mosques, women and men intermingling in religious ceremonies. The very dimen-
sions which among Sunni Turks tend to be interpreted as morally suspect and non-Islamic 
are  perceived  differently and  positively  by  German  audiences.  They  effectively  present 
Alevi beliefs and practice as a kind of Islam that in the German context tends to be inter-
preted as progressive and tolerant.  
Would the real Alevi please stand up – and speak up? Mainstream accounts of mi-
grant media are ill equipped to deal with strategies of articulating a ‘voice’ that are as di-
vergent as those presented above, because they often implicitly assume that any public ut-
terance made by a member of a migrant group will represent it in the double sense of 
‘speaking for’ and ‘presenting’, authenticated by virtue of his or her ethno-cultural mem-
bership.  
The  double  orientation  toward  fellow  migrants  and  non-immigrant  audiences  in 
Alevi media productions highlights the representational challenges which subaltern migrant 
media producers can face in their work. Marginalized for different reasons in both Turkey 
and Germany, Alevi producers focus much of their attention on countering the negative at-
titudes they suspect their audiences (migrant and non-migrant) to harbor. Marginalized on 
different grounds in relation to the cultural politics in Turkey and Germany respectively, 
they feel the need to engage with the dominant horizons of meaning in which they see their 
different audiences embedded. Seeking to intervene in dominant stereotypical discourses 
                                            
10 Literally: ‚extinguishing the candle’, an expression which refers to the alleged sexual looseness and hidden 
polygamy stereotypically thought to characterize mixed-sex Alevi gatherings. Research Group Transnationalism Working Paper Number 9 
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which reproduce their marginalization, the problem of how to represent their own differ-
ence differently takes center stage. Representations of Alevi identity are thus created strate-
gically by migrant producers, using the very semiotic material that forms part of their audi-
ences’ ideological horizons in an attempt to re-signify.  
What complicates this project of semiotic intervention is its transnational location in 
the margins of not just one but two nation-states and their arenas of cultural struggle. Veer-
ing between a multiculturalist lense that focuses on the allegedly more ‘benign’ nature of 
Alevi Islam in Germany, and a dominant Turkish perspective that tends to regard Alevi re-
ligious practices and beliefs as unislamic, Alevi migrant media appear somewhat confusing. 
It is only by taking into account the transnational dimensions of their cultural positioning in 
Western Europe that this apparent confusion can be resolved. Alevi migrant television pro-
grammes are intended by their producers as strategic interventions into different national 
fields of cultural struggle where the dominant terms have already been set, casting Alevis in 
each as a different kind of problematic minority. The interesting question is how migrant 
media ‘voices’ grapple with the collusion of these fields in the migration context.  
It would be reductive to assume that diasporic minority media function only as pub-
lic spheres in exile, with the main aim of voicing criticism directed at former countries of 
origin. As the example of Alevi broadcasting shows, migrant media can combine different 
orientations and strategies of representation, often prompted by nation-state related hege-
monic discourses that form the background against which migrant media producers have to 
articulate their ‘voices’. Thus, while it might be more difficult for state representatives to 
silence unwanted criticism that is circulated through new technological forms and media 
practices, diasporic media activism still faces the problem of how to escape the hegemonic 
reach of nation-states: not just in terms of managing to go and stay public, but in terms of 
how to voice criticism and address different publics in dominant media environments that 
powerfully marginalize or vilify minority concerns as a matter of ‘common sense’.  
For migrant broadcasters partaking in these different, colluding fields of cultural 
politics opened up by national histories and migration trajectories, the challenge and ambi-
tion is to intervene and produce alternative representations that will signify differently. Dif-
ference, articulated from almost always subaltern positions within these colluding fields, 
can mean tactical interventions into dominant discourses, switching strategies of alliance-
building, or attempts to create new common ground with audiences that is beyond conten-
tion. The study of migrant media can reveal a wide range of representational practices that 
articulate difference and 'reconcile' multiple cultural struggles in different ways. What it 
does not support is an argument which posits mediated migrant ‘voices’ as a simple addi-
tion to the pluralism or diversity of public spheres at local, national or transnational levels.  
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